बीजाङ्कुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि स ।
न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य युज्यते ॥ २० ॥bījāṅkurākhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadā sādhyasamo hi sa |
na hi sādhyasamo hetuḥ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate || 20 ||20. The illustration of the seed and the sprout is itself a matter which is yet to be proved. The middle term (that is, the illustration) which is itself yet to be proved (to be true) cannot be used for establishing a proposition to be proved.
Shankara Bhashya (commentary)
(Objection)—We have asserted the causal relation between the cause and the effect. But you have raised mere verbal1 difficulties to show the inconsistency in our statement and made a caricature of our standpoint by pointing out its absurdity like the birth of the father from the son or a causal relation between the two horns (of a bull), etc. We do not, for a moment, admit the production of an effect from a cause not already existent or of a cause from an effect not established.
(Reply)—What is, then, your contention?
(Objection)—We admit the causal relation as2 in the case of the seed and the sprout.
(Reply)—To this we reply as follows:—The illustration of the causal relation existing between the seed and the sprout is itself the same as the major term in my syllogism, that is to say, the3 illustration itself is to be proved.
(Objection)—It is apparent that the causal relation of the seed and the sprout is without beginning.
(Reply)—It is not so. The beginning of all antecedents must be admitted, as is the case with the consequents. As4 a sprout just produced from a seed is with beginning, similarly the seed also, produced from another sprout (existing in the past), by the very succession implied in the act of production, is with beginning. Therefore all antecedent sprouts as well as seeds are with beginning. As every seed and every sprout, among the seeds and the sprouts, are with beginning, so it is unreasonable to say that any one of these is without beginning. This is also equally applicable to the argument of the cause and the effect.
(OBjection)—Each5 of the series of the seeds and the sprouts is without beginning.
(Reply)—No. The unity or oneness of such series cannot be justified. Even those who maintain the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout, do not admit the existence of a thing known as the series of the seed and the sprout apart from the seed and the sprout. Nor do they admit such a series in the case of the cause and the effect. Therefore it has been rightly asked, “How do you assert the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect?” Other explanations being unreasonable, we have not raised any verbal difficulty. Even6 in our ordinary experience expert logicians do not use anything, which is yet to be established, as the middle term or illustration in order to establish relation between the major and the minor terms of a syllogism. The word Hetu or the middle term is used here in the sense of illustration, as it is the illustration which leads to the establishment of a proposition. In the context illustration is meant and not reason.
Anandagiri Tika (glossary)
1 Verbal, etc.—The opponent contends that the difficulties raised are merely verbal.
2 As in, etc.—It is like the production of the seed from the sprout and vice versa.
3 The illustration, etc.—Śaṅkara contends that it is to be proved that the seed is produced from a beginningless sprout or the sprout is produced from a beginningless seed.
4 As a sprout, etc.—The opponent contends that the bīja (seed or cause) is without beginning (Anādi) because he wants to make it Aja or beginningless. But Śaṅkara says that every bīja or seed is produced and therefore every bīja is with beginning. Hence the cause cannot be Aja or birthless.
5 Each, etc.—The opponent contends that there is a series of seed and there is another series of sprout. From the ‘seed series’ is produced the ‘sprout series’ and vice versa. Similarly, from the ‘cause series’ is produced the ‘effect series’ and vice versa.
6 Even, etc.—The illustration of the seed and the sprout has been given by the opponent to prove the beginninglessness of the Cause and the effect. But Śaṅkara contends that the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout in the illustration has not yet been proved. As a matter of fact it has been shown that both the seed and the sprout are with beginning. Hence this illustration which is itself not proved, cannot be admitted in support of the contention.