प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥ २३ ॥
prakṛtiśca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt || 23 ||
prakṛtiḥ—Material cause; ca—also; pratijñā-dṛṣṭānta-anuparodhāt—not being contradictory to the proposition and illustrations.
23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, (on account of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposition and the illustrations (cited in the Sruti).
Granted that Brahman is the cause of the world; but what kind of cause? Is It the efficient cause, or the material cause, or both? The prima facie view is that Brahman is only the efficient cause, as texts like “He thought, . . . he created Prana” (Pr. 6. 3-4) declare.
This view is refuted by this Sutra. Brahman is also the material cause of the world. Here ‘also’ shows that it is the efficient cause as well. It is only if Brahman is the material cause of the world that it is possible to know everything through the knowledge of Brahman, as texts like “By which that which is not heard becomes heard” etc. (Chh. 6. 1. 3) say; for the effects are not different from the cause. The illustrations referred to are: “My dear, as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known” etc. (Chh. 6. 1. 4). These texts clearly show that Brahman is the material cause of the world; otherwise they would be meaningless. Again texts like “Brahman alone was at the beginning one without a second” show that It is also the efficient cause, for who else could be such a cause when there was nothing else?