अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽग्नौ, शान्तायां वाचि किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति; आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिर्भवति, आत्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति ॥ ६ ॥
astamita āditye yājñavalkya, candramasyastamite, śānte’gnau, śāntāyāṃ vāci kiṃjyotirevāyaṃ puruṣa iti; ātmaivāsya jyotirbhavati, ātmanaivāyaṃ jyotiṣāste palyayate karma kurute vipalyetīti || 6 ||
6. ‘When the sun and the moon have both set, the fire has gone out, and speech has stopped, Yājñavalkya, what serves as the light for a man?’ ‘The self serves as his light. It is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns.’ ‘Just so, Yājñavalkya.’
When speech also has stopped and other external aids too, such as odour, all the activities of the mail Would stop. The idea is this: When the eyes and Other organs, which are outgoing in their tendencies, are helped in the waking state by lights such as the Sun, then a man vividly lives and moves in the world. So we see that in the waking state a light extraneous to his body, which is an aggregate of parts, serves as the light for him. From this we conclude that when all external light is blotted out in the states of dream and profound sleep, as well as in similar circumstances of the waking state, a light extraneous to his body serves the purpose of a light for him. We see also that the purpose of a light is served in dreams, as for instance meeting and parting from friends, going to other places, etc.; and we awake from deep sleep with the remembrance[6] that we slept happily and knew nothing. Therefore there exists some extraneous light. What is that light which acts when speech has stopped? The reply is being given: ‘The self serves as his light.’ By the word ‘self’ is meant that light which is different from one’s body and organs, and illumines them like the external lights such as the sun, but is itself not illumined by anything else. And on the principle of the residuum it is inside the body; for it has already been proved that it is different from the body and organs, and we have seen that a light which is different from the body and organs and helps their work is perceived by the organs such as the eye, but the light that we are discussing (the self) is not perceived by the eye etc., when lights such as the sun have ceased to work. Since, ho we vex, we see that the usual effects of t light are there, we conclude that ‘it is through the light of the self that he sits, goes out, works and returns Therefore we understand that this light must be inside the body. But it is different from lights such as the sun, and immaterial. That is why, unlike the sun etc., it is not perceived by the eye and so forth.
Objection (by the materialist): No, for we see that only things of the same class help each other. You are wrong to state as a proved fact that there is an inner light different from the sun etc. Why? Because we observe that the body and organs, which are material, are helped by lights such as the sun, which also are material and of the same cláss as the things helped. Here too we must infer in accordance with observed facts. Supposing that the light that helps the work of the body and organs is different from them like the sun etc., still it must be inferred as being of the same class as these, for the very reason that it helps them, as is the case with lights such as the sun. Your statement that because it is internal and is not perceived, it is different (from lights such as the sun), is falsified in the case of the eye etc.; for lights such as the eye are not perceived and are internal, but they are material just the same. Therefore it is only your imagination that you have proved the light of the self tö be essentially different from the body etc.
Moreover, as the existence of the light in question depends on that of the body and organs, it is presumed to possess the characteristics of the latter. Your inference,[7] being of the kind that is not based on a causal relation, is fallacious, because it is contradicted[8]! and it is by means of such an inference that yoa establish the light in question (the self) to be different from the body and organs, like the sun and so forth (being different from the objects they reveal). Besides, perception cannot be nullified by inference; and we see that this aggregate of body and organs sees, hears, thinks and knows. If that other light helps this aggregate like the sun etc., it cannot be the self, any more than the sun and the rest are. Rather it is the aggregate of body and organs, which directly does the functions of seeing etc., that is the self, and none else, for inference is invalid when it contradicts perception.
Reply: If this aggregate be the self that does the functions of seeing etc., how is it that, remaining as it is, it sometimes performs those functions and sometimes does not?
Objection: There is nothing wrong in it, because it is an observed fact. You cannot challenge facts on the ground of improbability. When you actually observe a fire-fly to be both luminous and non-luminous, you do not have to infer some other cause for it. If, however, you do infer it from some common feature, you may as well infer anything about everything, and nobody wants that. Nor must one deny the natural property of objects, for the natural heat of fire or the cold of water is not due to any other cause.
Reply: Suppose we say it all depends on the merits or demerits of people?
Objection: Then those merits or demerits themselves might habitually depend on some other cause. ‘
Reply: What if they do?
Objection: It would lead to a regressus in infinitum, which is not desirable.
Reply: Not so, for in dreams and remembrance we notice only things seen before. What the advocate of the nature theory has said about the functions of sight etc. belonging to the body, and not to the self, which is different from it, is wrong, for if these functions really belonged to the body, one would not see in a dream only things already seen. A blind man dreaming sees only things that he has already seen, and not unfamiliar forms, which one would find in Śākadvīpa,[9] for instance. This proves that he alone who sees in a dream only familiar things also saw things before, while the eyes were there—and not the body. If the body were the seer, it would not see in a dream only familiar sights when the eyes, the instruments of its vision, are taken out. And we know that even blind men, who have had their eyes taken out, say, ‘To-day I saw in a dream the Himalayan peak that I had seen before.’ Therefore it is clear that it is not the body, but he who dreams, that also saw things when the eyes were intact.
Similarly, in the case of remembrance, he who remembers being also the one who saw, the two are identical. Thus only can a person, after shutting his eyes, remember the forms he has seen before, just as he saw them. Therefore that which is shut is not the seer; but that which, when the eyes are shut, sees forms in remembrance, must have been the seer when the eyes were open. This is further proved by the fact that when the body is dead, no vision takes place, although the body is intact. If the body itself were the seer, even a dead body would continue to see and do similar functions. Therefore it is dear that the real agent of seeing etc. is not the body, but that whose absence deprives the body of the power of vision, and whose presence gives it that power.
Objection: Suppose the eyes and other organs themselves were the agents of vision and so forth?
Reply: No: the remembrance that one is touching the very thing that one has seen, would be impossible if there were different agents for these two acts.
Objection: Then let us say, it is the mind.
Reply: No; the mind also, being an object, like colour etc., cannot be the agent of vision and so forth. Therefore we conclude that the light in question is inside the body, and yet different from it like the sun etc.
You said, ‘Some light which is of the same olass as the body and organs must be inferred, since the sun and the like are of the same class as the things they help.’ This is wrong, for there is no hard and fast mle about this help. To explain: We see that fire is kindled with the help of straw, grass and other fuel, which are all modifications of earth. But from this we must not conclude that everywhere it is the modifications of earth that help to light a fire, for we notice that water, which.belongs to a different class, helps to kindle the fire of lightning and the fire in the stomach. Therefore, when something is helped by another, there is no restriction about their being of the same dass or of different classes. Sometimes men are helped by men, their own species, and sometimes by animals, plants, etc., which are of different species. Therefore the reason you adduced for your contention, that the body and organs are helped by lights that are of the same class as they, like the sun etc., falls to the ground.
Further you said that the argument put forward by us[10] does not prove the light in question to be either internal or different from the body and organs, because the reason stated is falsified in the case of the eye etc. This is wrong; all we have to do is to add to it the qualifying phrase ‘except the eyes and other organs.’ Your statement that the light in question must be a characteristic of the body is also incorrect, for it involves a contradiction with inference. The inference was that the light must be something else than the body and organs, like the sun etc.; and this premise of yours contradicts that. That the existence of the light depends on that of the body has been disproved by the fact that the light is absent in a dead body. If you challenge the validity of an inference of the kind not based on a causal relation, all our activities, including eating and drinking, would be impossible, which you certainly do not desire. We see in life that people who have experienced that hunger and thirst, for instance, are appeased by eating and drinking, proceed to adopt these means, expecting similar results; all this would be impossible. As a matter of fact, however, people who have the experience of eating and drinking infer on the ground of similarity that their hunger and thirst would be appeased if they ate and drank again, and proceed to act accordingly.
Your statement that this very body performs the functions of seeing etc. has already been refuted on the ground that in dreams and remembrance the seer is other than the body. This also refutes the view that the light in question is something other than the self. Your reference to the fire-fly etc. being sometimes luminous and sometimes not, is not in point, for the appearance or disappearance of the glow is due to the contraction or expansion of its wings or other parts of its body. You said that we must admit merit and demerit to have the nature of inevitably producing results. If you admit this, it will go against your own assumption.[11] By this the objection of a regressus in infinitum is also refuted. Therefore we conclude that there is a light which is other than the body and within it, and it is the self.