त्रयं वा इदम्—नाम रूपं कर्म; तेषां नाम्नां वागित्येतदेषामुक्थम्, अतो हि सर्वाणि नामान्य् उत्तिष्ठन्ति । एतदेषां साम, एतद्धि सर्वैर्नामभिः समम्; एतदेषां ब्रह्म, एतद्धि सर्वाणि नामानि बिभर्ति ॥ १ ॥
trayaṃ vā idam—nāma rūpaṃ karma; teṣāṃ nāmnāṃ vāgityetadeṣāmuktham, ato hi sarvāṇi nāmāny uttiṣṭhanti | etadeṣāṃ sāma, etaddhi sarvairnāmabhiḥ samam; etadeṣāṃ brahma, etaddhi sarvāṇi nāmāni bibharti || 1 ||
1. This (universe) indeed consists of three things: name, form and action. Of those names, speech (sound in general) is the Uktha (source), for all names spring from it. It is their Sāman (common feature), for it is common to all names. It is their Brahman (self), for it sustains all names.
The differentiated universe consisting of means and ends, which was introduced as the subject-matter of ignorance, with its results culminating in identification with the vital force, as well as its state prior to manifestation denoted by the word ‘undifferentiated,’ like a tree and its seed—all this indeed consists of three things. What are they? Name, form and action, all non-Self, and not the Self that is the Brahman, immediate and direct. Therefore one should turn away from it. This is the import of this section. One whose mind is not averse to this non-Self, has no inclination to meditate upon the Self, one’s own world, as ‘I am Brahman,’ for the two tendencies—one going outwards and the other devoting itself to the inner Self—are contradictory. Compare the following from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (IV. 1): ‘The self-born Lord injured the organs by making them outgoing in their tendencies. Therefore they perceive only external things, but not the inner Self. Once in a while some steady man, desiring immortality, turns his gaze inwards and sees the inner Self.’
How can one establish the fact that this differentiated and undifferentiated universe made up of actions, their factors and their results, consists only of name, form and action, and is not the Self? This is being answered: Of those names as set forth (in the preceding portion), speech, i.e. sound in general—for it has been stated, ‘And any kind of sound is but the organ of speech’ (I. v. 3)— is the Uktha, the cause or material of these particular names, as the salt rock is of particles of salt. This is expressed by the text: For all names, the differentiations such as Yajñadatta and Devadatta, spring from it, this generality of names, like particles of salt from the salt rock. And an effect is not separate from its cause. Also particulars are included in the general. How does the relation of general and particulars apply here? It, sound in general, is their Sāman, so called because of sameness, i.e., common feature. For it is common to all names, which are its own particular forms. Another reason is that the particular names, being derived from it, are not different from it. And we see that something which is derived from another is not different from it, as a jar, for instance, is not different from clay. How are particular names derived from speech? This is being explained: Because it, what is designated by the word ‘speech,’ is their Brahman, śelf, for names are derived from speech, since they have no reality apart from sound. This is being demonstrated: For it, sound in general, sustains or supports all names or particular sounds by giving them reality. Thus on account of their relation as cause and effect, and as general and particulars, and the one giving the other reality, particular names are proved to be just sound. Similarly in the next two paragraphs all this is to be applied as here set forth.